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BRINGING SEXY BRAC: THE CASE FOR ALLOWING
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS TO CONTROL ENVIRONMENTAL
CLEANUP IN THE MILITARY BASE CLOSURE AND
REDEVELOPMENT PROCESS
THOMAS WILLIAM "T.W." BRUNO*
INTRODUCTION
On November 9, 1989 the Berlin Wall fell,' and as the wall
descended, it lifted the Iron Curtain2 and signaled the end of a major
threat to the security of the United States. Without the threat of all-out
war, legislators and military officials could not justify the military's
cost. 3 In an effort to reduce spending and increase efficiency, Congress
enacted the Base Closure and Realignment Act, which vested closure
decision-making power with a commission4 that came to be designated
as the "Defense Base Realignment and Closure Commission" ("BRAC
Commission") .5
* T.W. Bruno is a 2008 J.D. candidate at the William & Mary School of Law. He received
his B.A. in Behavioral Biology from The Johns Hopkins University in 2003. The author
would like to thank his parents for their encouragement and support and Jamie Lynn
Watkins for giving him so much-including the title to this Note.
'See David Hoffman & Ann Devroy, Bush Hails 'Dramatic'Decision; President Sees End
of 'Iron Curtain Days', WASH. POST, Nov. 10, 1989, at A37.
2 See Winston Churchill, Sinews of Peace (the Iron Curtain Speech), Address at
Westminster College (Mar. 5, 1946), available at http://www.historyguide.orgeurope/
churchill.html ("From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic an iron curtain has
descended across the Continent.").
'See Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-463, 102 Stat. 2270
(stating that the Armed Forces spend more than $78 billion on military installations
each year).
4 Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act, Pub. L.
No. 100-526, §§ 201-203, 102 Stat. 2623, 2627-28 (1988).
'Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-510, §§ 2901-2903,
104 Stat. 1808, 1808-12, amended by Pub. L. No. 107-107, 115 Stat. 1342 (2001).
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Since the first BRAC Commission in 1988 ("BRAC I"),6 there have
been closure rounds in 1991, 7 1993,8 1995, 9 and most recently, in 2005.10
Cumulatively, base closures have saved the government almost $29 bil-
lion.1' After a base closes, the military must first offer the land to other
defense agencies, 2 then to other federal agencies, 3 and finally to state
and local governments 14 or a local redevelopment authority.' 5
The biggest hurdle the military faces before conveying the prop-
erty is environmental cleanup.' 6 The military must clean up a variety of
environmental toxins: unexploded ordnance, hazardous materials, and
fuel and oil spills. 17 "Regulatory gridlock" is the largest obstacle facing the
6 See generally DEF. SECRETARY'S COMM'N ON BASE REALIGNMENT & CLOSURE, BASE
REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURES; REPORT OF THE DEFENSE SECRETARY'S COMMISSION (1988)
[hereinafter 1988 BRAC REPORT].
' See generally DEF. BASE CLOSURE & REALIGNMENT COMM'N, 1991 REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT (1991) [hereinafter 1991 BRAC REPORT].
' See generally DEF. BASE CLOSURE & REALIGNMENT COMM'N, 1993 REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT (1993) [hereinafter 1993 BRAC REPORT].
9 See generally DEF. BASE CLOSURE & REALIGNMENT COMM'N, 1995 REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT (1995) [hereinafter 1995 BRAC REPORT].
10 See DEF. BASE CLOSURE & REALIGNMENT COMM'N, 2005 REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT
(2005) [hereinafter 2005 BRAC REPORT].
1l U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-614, MILITARY BASE CLOSURES:
OBSERVATIONS ON PRIOR AND CURRENT BRAC ROUNDS 11 (2005) [hereinafter GAO,
OBSERVATIONS ON PRIOR BRAC ROUNDS].
12 U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., INSTALLATIONS & ENV'T OFFICE, BASE REDEVELOPMENT AND
REALIGNMENT MANUAL 26 (2006) [hereinafter DOD, BASE REDEVELOPMENT AND
REALIGNMENT MANUAL], available at http://www.dod.mil/brac/pdf/4165-66-M-BRRM-
508.pdf.
13 id.
14 Id.
15 Id.
A local redevelopment authority is any authority or instrumentality
established by a state or local government and recognized by the
Secretary of Defense, through the Office of Economic Adjustment, as
the entity responsible for developing the redevelopment plan with
respect to an installation or for directing implementation of the (land
reuse) plan.
GAO, OBSERVATIONS ON PRIOR BRAC ROUNDS, supra note 11, at 6 n.8.
16 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/NSIAD-95-3, MILITARY BASES: REUSE PLANS FOR
SELECTED BASES CLOSED IN 1988 AND 1991, at 18 (1994).
17 Richard A. Wegman & Harold G. Bailey, Jr., The Challenge of Cleaning Up Military
Wastes When U.S. Bases Are Closed, 21 ECOLOGY L.Q. 865, 867 (1994).
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environmental cleanup effort.18 The military, federal government, fed-
eral regulators, state government, state regulators and local officials must
work together to facilitate the cleanup and ultimate base redevelopment.' 9
Base redevelopment is a key component in assisting with the economic
recovery of local communities.2° Officials participating in redevelopment
planning must integrate environmental cleanup with the land-reuse
plan.21 Both the leaving tenant (the military) and the incoming tenant
must deal with the environmental cleanup before they can begin the base
transfer and economic recovery.22 This Note addresses the environmental
and restoration problems facing local, state, and federal officials when
a military base closes. This Note offers the solution of increasing local
control and oversight along with encouraging privatization to resolve the
current gridlock between state and federal regulatory schemes. A similar
local solution has been successful in other environmental cleanup projects,
and Congress can promote it through its vast power under the Spending
Clause.
Section I of this Note outlines the environmental and base closure
laws that have led to this problem. Section II examines case studies of
closed military bases and focuses on environmental and redevelopment
responses. Section III proposes a solution to govern current and future
base closures that speeds economic recovery and environmental cleanup.
Section IV analyzes the proper method for Congress to retain oversight and
ensure complete cleanup by promulgating its regulation of state enforce-
ment under the Spending Clause.
"See Major Stuart W. Risch, The National Environmental Committee:A Proposal to Relieve
Regulatory Gridlock at Federal Facility Superfund Sites, 151 MIL. L. REV. 1, 6,57-76 (1996).
19 See DOD, BASE REDEVELOPMENT AND REALIGNMENT MANUAL, supra note 12, at 18-19
(outlining the key characteristics to successful disposal of closing military installations:
consultation, cooperation, consider community needs, innovation, common sense, delegate,
and growth management principles).
20 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/NSIAD-99-36, MILITARY BASES: STATUS OF PRIOR
BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE ROUNDS 75 (1998) [hereinafter GAO, STATUS OF PRIOR
ROUNDS].21 See MARY KAY BAILEY ET AL., ENvTL. PROT. AGENCY, TURNING BASES INTO GREAT PLACES
9 (2006), available at http://www.epa.gov/smartgrowth/pdf/bases-into-places.pdf.22 Compare Risch, supra note 18, at 6 (noting the competing interests at play), with DOD,
BASE REDEVELOPMENT AND REALIGNMENT MANUAL, supra note 12, at 18-19 (outlining
how all parties must work together).
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I. CERCLA, RCRA, STATE COUNTERPARTS, AND THE BRAC
PROCEDURAL LAWS: Too MANY COOKS 23 (WITH Too MANY
LAWS) SPOIL CLEANUP EFFORTS
A. Complying with So Many Different Laws Leads to Confusion
and Gridlock
The federal government first embarked on comprehensive environ-
mental legislation in the 1970s.24 Currently, two main federal laws govern
environmental liability: the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
("RCRA"), enacted in 1976,25 and the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA"), enacted in
1980,26 commonly known as the "Superfund."27 Following the federal
government's lead, states have enacted their own CERCLA laws that
impose varying degrees of liability.2"
Confusion and gridlock rest at the intersection of the two federal
laws and their state counterparts, as well as the BRAC procedural re-
quirements.29 This leads to delays in base redevelopment and worsens
23 CHRISTINE AMMER, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF IDIOMS 669-70 (1997)
("Too many cooks spoil the broth.").
Peter B. Prestley, The Future of Superfund, 79 A.B.A. J. 62, 62-63 (1993).
25 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795,
amended by Solid Waste Disposal Act Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-482, 94 Stat.
2334 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (2000)).
26 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, Pub.
L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767, amended by Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization
Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675
(2000)). See also Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388
(1990).
27 Risch, supra note 18, at 4 n. 17 ("The CERCLA initially created a $16 billion fund for
use in responding to releases or threatened releases of hazardous substances at any site
nationwide, hence the nickname "Superfund." (citing 42 U.S.C. §9601(11) (2000))).21 See Joel B. Eisen, "Brownfields ofDreams"?: Challenges and Limits of Voluntary Cleanup
Programs and Incentives, 1996 U. ILL. L. REv. 883, 915-22 (1996) (discussing the number
of state CERCLA statutes that have been amended to include voluntary cleanup schemes,
and states that have enacted voluntary cleanup schemes independently of their CERCLA
statutes).
2 See Risch, supra note 18, at 6-7 ("Who controls the cleanup? Who sets the clean-up
standards? Who selects the clean-up remedy? Who pays the staggering clean-up costs?
The stakes for federal facilities, and our country, are enormous.").
[Vol. 32:513516
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the economic impact of the closing base on local communities. 30 The con-
fusion stems from the lack of specific standards for cleanup,3' and the
question of which law applies.32 The following is a brief introduction to the
laws that create this state of confusion and gridlock.
B. The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)
Congress's first attempt to regulate the disposal of hazardous waste
was with the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976.33 RCRA
seeks to "control solid and hazardous wastes from their generation through
their disposal.... [and] regulat[e] all wastes that are not covered under
another statute."34 Congress designed RCRA to act prospectively and the
statute requires licensure prior to allowing a facility to handle hazardous
wastes.35 Military bases have handled hazardous wastes both before and
after Congress passed RCRA, which means RCRA is an incomplete regu-
lation in the military base context.3 s
30 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH CLOSING
MILITARY BASES 3 (1992); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/NSIAD-94-133,
ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP: Too MANY HIGH PRIORITY SITES IMPEDE DOD'S PROGRAM 4-5
(1994) (highlighting that only 85 sites out of over 2500 had been completely cleaned up);
Hearings on the DOD Environmental Program Supplemental Appropriation Request Before
the DOD Environmental Restoration Program of the H. Comm. on Armed Servs., 102d Cong.
5 (1992) (statement of James Werner, Natural Resources Defense Council).
31 See Wegman & Bailey, supra note 17, at 883 ("CERCLA differs from many other federal
environmental statutes in that it does not prescribe the substantive standards that reme-
diation actions are to attain." (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9621(d) (1994))).
32 See United States v. Colo., 990 F.2d 1565 (10th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 443
(1994) (holding that Colorado could enforce its state standards against the Rocky Mountain
Arsenal); see also Major William Turkula, Determining Cleanup Standards for Hazardous
Waste Sites, 135 MIL. L. REV. 167, 171-73 (1992) (noting that states have faced difficulty
in enforcing stricter cleanup standards under several environmental laws, especially in
the context of military bases).33 See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (2000).
"4 Risch, supra note 18, at 18-19 (citations omitted).3 5 Id. at 19-20 ("Congress designed this legislation with the ultimate goal of ensuring the
safe handling of wastes throughout their lifecycle.").36 See id. at 42-46 ("The Pentagon's arsenal, assembled over 40 years to keep the lid on
superpower conflict, has left deep [environmental] scars on the home front.'" (quoting
Bill Turque & John McCormick, The Military's Toxic Legacy, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 6, 1990,
at 20)). See generally Wegman & Bailey, supra note 17 (describing the toxic effects of the
military's history and the cleanup required from it at national and international bases).
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C. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act (CERCLA)
When Congress enacted CERCLA it sought to regulate what RCRA
had missed and require the current owner (for our purposes the Defense
Department) to "remediate contamination and assume financial liability."'
Congress added to the confusion when it strengthened CERCLA in 198638
by allowing state environmental law to govern cleanup actions at federal
facilities.39 While state law can be stricter than federal law, states could
not single out federal facilities with excessive or discriminating liability.4 °
By permitting the states to be proactive with enforcement, CERCLA was
supposed to decrease public concern and confusion over cleanups 4' and to
emphasize "permanent cleanups,"42 but Congress ultimately failed.43 "Due
to [Superfund's] new stringent cleanup standards, the cost of cleanup has
increased dramatically."44 The addition of state standards to the cleanup
process increase delays and confusion.45
37 Wegman & Bailey, supra note 17, at 884 (footnotes omitted) (noting that this standard
waives the government's sovereign immunity (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(21), 9607(a), (1988))).
See also Robert C. Davis, Jr. & R.T. McCrum, Environmental Liability for Federal Lands
and Facilities, 6 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 31, 32 (1991).
38 See Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100
Stat. 1613 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2000)).
39 42 U.S.C. § 9620(a)(4) (1988).40 See id. § 9620(a)(4); David W. Goewey, Note, Assuring Federal Facility Compliance with
the RCRA and Other Environmental Statutes: An Administrative Proposal, 28 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 513, 523-25 (1987).
41 See Wegman & Bailey, supra note 17, at 885 (noting that the CERCLA amendments
would also permit state enforcement actions against the government).
42 Risch, supra note 18, at 39 (footnote omitted). See also Timothy B. Atkeson et al., An
Annotated Legislative History of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of
1986 (SARA), 16 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10360, 10363-10433 (1986) ("The
emphasis in SARA § 121 on permanent cleanups is new and based on very little en-
gineering experience.").
43 See Wegman & Bailey, supra note 17, at 885-86 (noting that Congress returned to the
issue after many lawsuits and an administration change).
" Kristin M. Carter, Note, Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986:
Limiting Judicial Review to the Administrative Record in Cost Recovery Actions by the
EPA, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 1152, 1159, 1164 (1989) (citing 17 Env't Rep. (BNA) 778-79
(Sept. 26, 1986)) (indicating that cleanup and litigation costs would soar).
4 Ensign Jason H. Eaton, Creating Confusion: The Tenth Circuit's Rocky Mountain Arsenal
Decision, 144 MIL. L. REV. 126, 142-45 (1994) ("These costs [of involving state regulation
in environmental cleanup) are not worth the return of slower cleanups. No evidence exists
that the sites will become any cleaner. And taxpayers would end up paying for more of
the cleanup as responsible parties go bankrupt from litigation expense.").
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D. State Statutes: Pushing Their Own Agenda or Offering More
Protection?
State statutes have varying degrees of liability,46 oversight,47
voluntariness, 48 structure,49 and qualifications of hazardous waste."0 The
tension between state and federal regulations surfaces when states or
citizens sue the government in state court to enforce the state laws.51 In
United States v. Colorado, the Tenth Circuit upheld the state's right to
compel the federal government to adhere to the stricter state cleanup
standards.52 Several courts of appeals have distinguished Colorado from
cases where private citizens bring suit to compel stricter cleanup,53 but as
long as the waters remain muddied the varying levels of state regulation
will cause problems for developers who cannot properly judge their lia-
bility.54 Greater state regulation allows local governments to be more
accountable,5 but also puts local officials under greater pressure from
businesses and the public.56 In the highly politicized and localized BRAC
context, 57 the involvement of state officials can be a double-edged sword.
4 See id. at 142-43 (identifying the different coverage and costs of state legislation).
41 See R. Michael Sweeney, Brownfields Restoration and Voluntary Cleanup Legislation,
2 ENVTL. LAw. 101, 121 (1995) (noting that states are trending to less oversight).
' Eisen, supra note 28, at 917-18 ("Some states.., have extensive programs tailored to
redevelopment.., whereas others... have more limited voluntary cleanup statutes.").4 1 Id. at 918 ("The statutes vary widely in their structure and provisions."). For a listing
of different ways states have crafted their environmental regulation statutes, see id. at
nn. 172-78.
50 Eaton, supra note 45, at 142.
51 See United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d 1565 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that the State of
Colorado could enforce its own state regulations against the military and require addi-
tional cleanup on a closed military base). See generally Eaton, supra note 45 (outlining
the ramifications of the Tenth Circuit's decision).
52 See Colorado, 990 F.2d at 1581.
5 See Eaton, supra note 45, at 139-41 (identifying the Eighth, Third, First and Fifth
Circuits as having distinguished the Tenth Circuit's Colorado decision on grounds that
a state brought the action and not an individual).
' See William W. Buzbee, Brownfields, Environmental Federalism, and Institutional
Determinism, 21 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLY REV. 1, 55 (1997) (indicating that states
have benefitted from passing their own statutes that mimic the federal statutes because
the new state regulations reduce uncertainty and liability fears).
55 See Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570,609-
10 (1996).56 Buzbee, supra note 54, at 50-54 (detailing how state officials make the decision of what
to regulate and how accommodating the officials can be to industry and public needs).
57 GAO, OBSERVATIONS ON PRIOR BRAC ROUNDS, supra note 11, at 18 ("Closing unneeded
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E. The BRAC Procedural Laws and Requirements Impose an
Additional Level of Regulation on the Already Confusing
Cleanup Process
The BRAC process and subsequent base closure require adherence
to a plethora of laws"8 and the integration of federal, state and local offi-
cials and regulatory agencies.59 The Base Closure and Realignment Act of
198860 and the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 pro-
vide the foundation for the BRAC process.6 The closure acts require the
BRAC process to comply with the many environmental protection laws
that govern property cleanup and disposal, like RCRA and CERCLA"
The BRAC process is a long, sequential, and complex process that
requires the Commission to take many steps before it decides to close a
base" and requires additional steps after such a decision has been made.'
Once the Commission decides to close a base, the Defense Depart-
ment ("DOD") must adhere to a complex transfer process.65 The DOD
must determine whether another military branch or another federal
agency like Housing and Urban Development could use the site.66 When
DOD has determined that the federal government no longer needs the
defense facilities has historically been difficult because of public concern about the eco-
nomic effects of closures on communities and the perceived lack of impartiality in the
decision-making process.").
58 DOD, BASE REDEVELOPMENT AND REALIGNMENT MANUAL, supra note 12, at 129-34 (listing
over fifty regulations that govern the BRAC closure and environmental cleanup process).
59 INTERSTATE TECH. & REGULATORY COUNCIL, PROPERTY REVITALIZATION- LESSONS
LEARNED FROM BRAC AND BROWNFIELDS iii (2006) [hereinafter ITRC LESSONS LEARNED],
available at http://www.itrcweb.org/Documents/Brnfld-2web.pdf.
o Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act, Pub. L.
No. 100-526, 102 Stat. 2623 (1988).
61 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-510, 104 Stat.
1485 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 2687 (2000)).
62 ITRC LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 59, at 2.
r U.S. GovTrAcCOu-NTABILrrY OFFICE, GAO-05-785, MILITARY BASES: ANALYSIS OF DOD's
2005 SELECTION PROCESS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BASE CLOSURES AND REALIGN-
MENTS 30 (2005) [hereinafter GAO, 2005 SELECTION PROCESS] ("The BRAC recom-
mendations, for the most part, resulted from a data-intensive process... [that] began
with a set of sequential steps by assessing capacity and military value, developing and
analyzing scenarios, then identifying candidate recommendations, which led to [final
recommendations].").
6 See ITRC LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 59, at 3.
65 See id.
6 Id; see also Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 100-77, 101
Stat. 482 (1987) (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 11301 et seq. (2000)).
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property, a Local Redevelopment Authority ("LRA")67 must develop a reuse
plan for the site.6"
After the LRA has completed its reuse plan, the DOD can commence
the transfer process.69 The DOD can transfer BRAC property in several
different ways: public conveyance, economic development conveyance,
conservation conveyance, public or negotiated sale, lease, or early transfer,
and privatization. ° The DOD cannot transfer property until it, the LRA,
or a private contractor addresses the environmental contamination, the
extent of future liability, and whether the state or federal government
has regulatory control.71 The DOD has made a priority of quickly trans-
ferring property to LRAs because doing so speeds economic redevelopment,
but it has failed to follow through because of the multitude of problems
facing the BRAC closure, cleanup and redevelopment process.
With the problem of overlapping and excessive regulation estab-
lished, this Note analyzes the interaction of the laws, the agencies, and the
elected officials in two case studies of BRAC-closed military bases. After
evaluating the successes and failures of these closed bases, this Note crafts
a solution based on increased state and local control, which would speed
up cleanup, transfer, and, ultimately, economic recovery.
II. CASE STUDIES: Do SUCCESS STORIES HAVE ANYTHING IN
COMMON?
A. Fort McClellan, Alabama
1. Background
Fort McClellan, located in Anniston, Alabama, closed in 1999 as
part of the 1995 BRAC Commission ("BRAC IV") recommendations. 2
67 ITRC LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 59, at 3. ("The Local Reuse or Redevelopment
Authority is an entity, usually convened by the local government, consisting of business
interests and/or local citizens who are concerned about the reuse of the BRAC installation.
The LRA is responsible for planning the installation's reuse.").6 8 Id. at 3.
69 Id. at 4.
70 Id. at 4-5.
71 Id. at 6-7.
72 Samantha L. Quigley, BRAC: McClellan Loses 'Fort,' Gains 18,000-acre Community,
DEFENSELINKNEwS, Aug. 23,2005, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Aug2005/20050823
_2513.html.
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Fort McClellan's closure eliminated over 2,000 civilian jobs and left almost
20,000 acres of land to the State of Alabama.7 3 Fort McClellan housed the
U.S. Army Chemical School and was the sole site for Chemical Defense
Training."M The site is not listed as a Superfund site, but the Commission
noted that the environmental damage would leave the community with
very little land to reuse.75 The economic impact of closing Fort McClellan
was the largest of any of the proposed closures during the 1995 round.76
2. Environmental Costs of Closure and Effect on BRAC Status
The base's environmental status was so serious that it was a factor
in the 1991 BRAC Commission's decision to reject the DOD's recommen-
dation for closure.77 The Commission thought the waste management and
environmental compliance costs were too high, but surprisingly, the cost
of environmental restoration was not prohibitive.7"
The DOD tapped the base for closure again in 1993.' 9 During the
1993 round, the DOD based its recommendation again on the size of the
facility and the financial savings."0 Again, the Commission did not accept
the DOD's recommendation, but instead decided to keep the fort open."1
73 GAO, OBSERVATIONS ON PRIOR BRAC ROUNDS, supra note 11, at 26, 31.
74 1995 BRAC REPORT, supra note 9, at 1-1.
75 Id. at 1-2.
76 Id.
77 1991 BRAC REPORT, supra note 7, at 5-9.7
1 See id.; GAO, 2005 SELECTION PROCESS, supra note 63, at 14, 20 n.24. Environmental
restoration costs are not part of the BRAC formula so the high environmental closure
cost must come from the immediate need to clean up waste or hazards. The Army, during
the first few BRAC rounds, did use environmental compliance costs as a reason to keep
bases operational despite the fact it should not consider those costs. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, GAO/T-NSIAD-95-107, MILITARY BASES: CHALLENGES IN IDENTIFYING AND
IMPLEMENTING CLOSURE RECOMMENDATIONS 4 (1995) [hereinafter GAO, CHALLENGES IN
IDENTIFYING AND IMPLEMENTING].
79 1993 BRAC REPORT, supra note 8, at 1-1.
0 Id. at 1-1 (noting that "Fort McClellan has the least amount of facilities and smallest
population" of the Army's entry or school facilities).
" Id. at 1-3. In the 1993 Report the Commission did not mention that environmental costs
factored into their decision at all. The decision was based more on military preparedness.
However, the Commission alluded to the environmental problems waiting on the base when
it did close. The Commission recommended that if the Army was to move the Chemical
School and Training Facility, it should pursue the required environmental permits and
certification for the new location before the next round of BRAC closures. Id.
[Vol. 32:513522
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Unfortunately for Fort McClellan, the third time was not the charm.
The base was pegged again for closure during the 1995 BRAC process.8 2
The DOD offered the same justifications and planned to reorganize the
chemical facilities on the base.' During the hearing process, the local com-
munity cited the DOD's failure to obtain environmental permits for the
new location and the extra $120 million in costs, including over $50 million
in environmental costs, the military would incur in preparing for demili-
tarization.84 The community also acknowledged that the environmental
contamination was so widespread that the community could reuse very
little of the land. 5 Because the environmental permits of the new site were
not yet available, the Commission decided the fort would stay operational
until the replacement was ready, but would close Fort McClellan at that
time. 8 The Commission gave a portion of Fort McClellan's chemical
82 1995 BRAC REPORT, supra note 9, at 1-2.
8 See id. at 1-2; 1993 BRAC REPORT, supra note 8, at 1-1 to 1-3. Both DOD justification
sections provide similar reasons.
8 1995 BRAC REPORT, supra note 9, at 1-2. Economic impact and threat to national
security were two other defenses that proponents of Fort McClellan used when lobbying
the BRAC Commission. Press Release, Congressional Press Releases, Browder Sees
California Intervention as Politics Over Security, Says Closing Alabama's Fort McClellan
Affects National Security and Economy (July 7, 1995).
85 1995 BRAC REPORT, supra note 9, at 1-2. The people of Anniston County, where Fort
McClellan is located, were very worried about the chemical and environmental impact
of the Army's activities on Fort McClellan. The local residents allowed the Army to build
an incinerator that would burn old and unused chemical weapons, which included over five
million pounds of sarin nerve gas and other poisons. They voted to approve the incin-
erator in spite of their concern over its uses because they believed that the incinerator's
presence would ensure that the fort remained open. Rick Bragg, From Trust in the Army
to a Sense of Betrayal, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 1995, (outlining the fear the community had
over the contamination of the land and the community's sense of betrayal). When the in-
cinerator was set to open in 2003, the community's fears were revisited and the Chemical
Weapons Working Group and others filed for an injunction to prevent the burning of
poisons. See Families Concerned About Nerve Gas Incineration v. U.S. Dep't of the Army,
380 F. Supp. 2d 1233 (N.D. Ala. 2005); Chem. Weapons Working Group v. United States,
No. 03-0645, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13795 (D.D.C. Aug. 8, 2003); Families Concerned
About Nerve Gas Incineration v. U.S. Dep't of the Army, No. CV-02-BE-2822-E, 2003
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26683 (N.D. Ala. July 8, 2003); see also Military Incinerator Unnerves
Town: Stockpile of Decades-old Chemical Weapons to be Burned at Alabama Site,
SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 6, 2003, at A4.
86 1995 BRAC REPORT, supra note 9, at 1-2; see also Tom Uhlenbrock, Toxic Gas at Fort
Leonard Wood Makes Its Neighbors Happy, Environmentalists; Nervous, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, Mar. 7, 1999, at A10 (noting that the community which was receiving the bulk
of Fort McClellan's chemical training activities was accepting it easily).
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training area to the Department of Justice, which currently uses it as
grounds for chemical and biological anti-terrorism training.
8 7
3. The Redevelopment Process: Early Transfer and Private
Cleanup
Fort McClellan lowered its flag for the last time on September 30,
1999,8 at which time the federal government transferred a portion of the
land to the Anniston-Calhoun County Fort McClellan Development Joint
Powers Authority ("JPA"). 9 The redevelopment of the fort was voted the
most important local news story of the year.90
The Army found a private contractor, Foster Wheeler Corporation,
to handle the cleanup and environmental restoration of the unexploded
ordnance located on portions of the fort.9 However, state environmental
" Congressional Press Releases, Sen. Shelby Instrumental in Committee Approval of
Funding for Terrorism Training Facility at Fort McClellan Facility Will Create Approxi-
mately 1000 New Jobs (July 15, 1997).
' Major Kent D. Davis, A Logistics Perspective on Closing Fort McClellan, U.S. ARMY
LOGISTICIAN 44,44 (Mar.-Apr. 2000), available at http://www.almc.army.mil/alog/issues/
MarApr00/MS521.htm.
89 Charles Seabrook, City Rebounds From Base Closing: As More Shutdowns Near,
Anniston, Ala., Holds Lesson for Georgia, ATLANTA J. CONST., June 27, 2005, at 1A
(noting the great success of Fort McClellan's transformation to the town of McClellan,
but that the JPA still retains title to 12,000 acres of land, more than half of what the
military transferred, because of ongoing environmental cleanup efforts).
90 Geni Certain, Fort Redevelopment Tops 2000 News Coverage, ANNISTON STAR, Dec. 31,
2000, available at http://www.annistonstar.com/news/2000/as-localnews-1231-gcertain-
um315779.htm. Not only was the fort's redevelopment voted the top local news story, but
it beat out news that a Superfund site was being opened nearby as well as news of the
coaching change and signing of a top recruit for the University of Alabama football team.
Id. If you know anything about Alabama football, you know how big a story that is.
91 Foster Wheeler Awarded $50 Million Contract for Ordnance and Explosive Cleanup,
Bus. WIRE, Nov. 30, 1999 (the contract was for $50 million over the next five years). The
contract price may not be entirely accurate as the cost of restoring ranges with unexploded
ordnance is higher than what the military initially estimates. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, GAO-01-479, ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITIES: DOD TRAINING RANGE CLEANUP COST
ESTIMATES ARE LIKELY UNDERSTATED 4-5 (2001). The Army also noted that the cleanup
of hazardous and toxic materials would be costly and possibly lengthy. U.S. DEP'T OF THE
ARMY, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT: DISPOSAL AND REUSE OF FORT
MCCLELLAN, ALABAMA 5-92 (1998) [hereinafter FORT MCCLELLAN IMPACT STATEMENT].
From the you-get-what-you-pay-for department, allegations soon surfaced that Foster
Wheeler was not destroying the unexploded ordnance but illegally hiding it on site. This
allegedly occurred at Fort McClellan and other sites where Foster Wheeler was the con-
tractor. Press Release, Senator Richard C. Shelby, Shelby Calls for Army Secretary's
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regulators shut down the cleanup efforts when they determined that
Foster Wheeler, now Tetra Tech FW, was hiding and not destroying the
unexploded ordnance.92 The DOD transferred title of the almost 5,000
acres to the JPA before the cleanup project was finished, marking the
first time the DOD had transferred a BRAC-closed military base to local
authorities before finalizing the environmental cleanup.93 The JPA and
DOD believed this would lead to a speedier cleanup and quicker recovery.94
Initially, the military was worried that the fast-track privatization would
encounter difficulties because the Alabama Department of Environmental
Management was unable to provide a full-time employee to supervise the
cleanup effort.95 However, the Army and state government were able to
speed up part of the transfer process and funded a portion of the transfer
of Fort McClellan to Fort Leonard Wood a year earlier than expected.96
4. Roadblocks to Redevelopment
The Base Closure Community Redevelopment and Homeless
Assistance Act of 1994 (BCCRHAA) amended the Defense Base Closure
and Realignment Act of 1990 to require a Local Redevelopment Authority
("LRA") to screen the surplus property.97 In preparation for the base clo-
sure, Fort McClellan's community received over $1.7 million in federal
grants to plan and implement the community's redevelopment plan.98
Immediate Attention to UXO Case at Ft. McClellan (Aug. 27, 2004), available at http:l
shelby.senate.gov/news/record.cfm?id=225591.9 Mary Orndorff, State Shuts Down McClellan Cleanup ADEM: Contractor Not Destroying
Old Ordnance, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Aug. 3, 2004, at 1C.
93 Darryal Ray, 5,000Acres at McClellan Transferred, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Sept. 15, 2003.
94Id
95 U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, BRAC CLEANUP PLAN ABSTRACT: FORT MCCLELLAN (1996),
available at https://www.denix.osd.mil/denix/Public/Policy/BRAC/Nov96/ftmcclln.html.
The state acted quickly and prevented any significant delay in the fast-track process. See
U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, BRAC CLEANUP PLAN ABSTRACT: FORT MCCLELLAN (1997),
available at httpsJ/www.denix.osd.mil/denix/Public/Policy/BRAC/BCP/Jun97/note52.html
(failing to mention anything about a state employee, or any action that the state needed
to take to ensure a seamless progress through the fast-track process).
96 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/NSIAD-99-149, MILITARY BASE CLOSURES:
POTENTIAL TO OFFSET FISCAL YEAR 2000 BUDGET REQUEST 7-8 (1999).
97 FORT MCCLELLAN IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 91, at 2-17.
98 GAO, STATUS OF PRIOR ROUNDS, supra note 20, at 83 (noting that the Office of
Economic Adjustment ("OEA") contributed $1.2 million and the Economic Development
Administration ("EDA") contributed $510,000 for a total of $1.71 million in grants).
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The redevelopment group (the Fort McClellan Development Com-
mission, or FMDC) did not face many zoning restrictions when creating
its development plan.99 Much of the slow progress in reuse planning and
disposal process is due to changing local and federal laws and environ-
mental cleanup. 00 Though Fort McClellan did not face challenges from
zoning laws, it did face other initial problems during its redevelopment. 101
Fort McClellan did not have a redevelopment board in place when the
BRAC IV Commission made its final recommendation, 0 2 so officials created
a thirteen-member board of citizens to serve as the redevelopment author-
ity.10 3 Elected state, county, and municipal officials took part in the appoint-
ment process, but no elected official was permitted to sit on the board.' 4
The state legislature created an oversight committee and the governor sent
a representative to several meetings,' both of which resulted in further
debate over control that slowed redevelopment.0 6 Additionally, the JPA
did not hold open meetings, which created distrust among citizens and
led to a lawsuit. 107
99 FORTMCCLELLAN IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 91, at 4-3 to 4-4. Fort McClellan was
bordered by Calhoun County to the north and east, and the cities of Anniston to the west
and southwest, and Oxford to the south. Calhoun County had no zoning restrictions at
the time of the redevelopment plan. The adjacent portions of both Anniston and Oxford
were zoned residential, but along the western border a small portion of Anniston was
zoned commercial. Id.
100 GAO, CHALLENGES IN IDENTIFYING AND IMPLEMENTING, supra note 78, at 6-7.
101 Jerry L. Smith, Editorial, Community Must Cope With Life After Fort McClellan,
BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Oct. 29, 1995, at 7C. Initial problems included an uncertain closure
timetable, uncertain environmental cleanup costs and timetable, National Guard acqui-
sition of land, and multiple jurisdictional voices in redevelopment, as the fort is wholly
within Calhoun County but impacts many municipalities. Id.
102 Michael Wallace, Other Cities That Lost Bases TellAnniston: Get Over It, BIRMINGHAM
NEWS, June 26, 1995, at 6A. After the official 1995 closure determination the only local
authority that had any connection with Fort McClellan was the Economic Assistance
Authority, a Plan-A organization tasked with lobbying to keep the fort open. However,
political leaders could not agree to assign it the responsibility of handling redevelopment
so it was disbanded after the official closure decision. Smith, supra note 101, at 7C.
103 Smith, supra note 101, at 7C.
104 Id.
105 Id.
116 See Rose Livingston, Fort McClellan Authority Rebuilds Lost Momentum, BIRMINGHAM
NEWS, Sept. 20, 1998, at 18A. Local leaders fought over control and only after the leader-
ship was "overhauled" could the authority take on its goals. One party who was interested
in relocating to the base site delayed consideration until the leadership problem was fixed.
Id.
o7 Rose Livingston, Settlement Reached on Fort Land Deals, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Mar. 24,
2001. The State Attorney General had determined that Alabama's Public Meetings Law
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After the Commission approves a closure or realignment list, the
affected community must "build community support," "determine how
to properly redevelop the property," bring in outside consultants, and
"partner with the Office of Economic Adjustment"("OEA").'0 This under-
states the lengthy process, however, as planning for and implementing
redevelopment can extend for years.1°9 Fort McClellan's redevelopment
did not move forward until the JPA fully integrated itself with local author-
ities and opened itself to public scrutiny.110 With Fort McClellan's process
in mind, this Note evaluates the redevelopment process of Fort Monmouth.
B. Fort Monmouth
1. Background
Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, is a major military base located near
the shore communities of Monmouth County.' The 2005 BRAC Commis-
sion (BRAC V) recommended closing the fort and distributing its diverse
set of activities to other locations. 2 The fort has been a part of every
BRAC round, though typically its duties have been increased rather than
did not apply to the Fort McClellan Development Joint Powers Authority, and so the JPA
was not required to disclose any offers or contracts connected with the redevelopment of
Fort McClellan. 2000 Ala. AG LEXIS 183 (Ala. AG 2000).
108 TODD HERBERGHS, NAID, AN ASS'N OF DEF. CMTYS., UNDERSTANDING BASE REALIGNMENT:
WHAT COMMUNITIES SHOULD KNOW FIRST 10 (2005) [hereinafter HERBERGHS, WHAT
COMMUNITIES SHOULD KNOW], available at http://www.defense communities.org/
Downloads/BaseRealignment.pdf. The OEA can provide grants to help organize and
plan the redevelopment process. Id.
9 Id. (noting that redevelopment is a slow process because of complicated environmental
issues, and slow military transfer among other problems). The report cites as a case study
Grissom Air Force Base in Indiana. The base was realigned (not completely closed) and yet
it took years for the military to turn the property over to local authorities in part because
of environmental contamination. The contamination was limited to fuel spills and under-
ground storage tanks, which is not as drastic as other locations. Id. at 13.
"1 Livingston, supra note 107.
1" Kirk Semple, Pentagon's Plan Brings Relief and Dismay, N.Y. TIMES, May, 14, 2005,
atAll; Fort Monmouth, NJ, Local Info, http://www.monmouth.army.mil/C4ISR/local.shtml
(last visited Jan. 10, 2008).
112 2005 BRAC REPORT, supra note 10, at 10-12. Fort Monmouth houses the U.S. Army
Military Academy Preparatory School, the Joint Network Management System for
Consumable Items, the Electronic Warfare and Electronics Research & Development,
and the Enterprise Information Systems. Id.
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decreased."' In 2005, the community did not voice any concerns over the
environmental quality of the fort." 4
2. Environmental Costs of Closure and Effects on BRAC Status
The Commission did note the type of environmental restoration
the military faced before it could disperse the land to the community.1 5
At the time of the Commission's 2005 report, $11 million had already been
spent on restoration and the remaining costs were expected to be as high
as $100 million."' The good news for the fort was that the environmental
conditions would not hinder reuse, that cleanup work had already started,
and that the Army might complete the cleanup in four years."'
113 See 1988 BRAC REPORT, supra note 6, at 68-69 (indicating that Fort Monmouth would
relocate duties assigned to Information Systems Command to Fort Devens, Massachusetts);
1991 BRAC REPORT, supra note 7, at 5-6, 5-13 (indicating that the 1988 Commission's
recommended move would be abandoned, but that the Electronic Technology Device
Laboratory would move to Adelphi Laboratory); 1993 BRAC REPORT, supra note 8, at 1-3
to 1-5 (recommending that the U.S. Army Communications Electronic Command (CECOM)
be moved onto the base. The Commission also recommended moving elements of the
Intelligence Material Management Center (IMMC) to Fort Monmouth from Vint Hill
Farms, Virginia); 1995 BRAC REPORT, supra note 9, at 1-20 to 1-22, 1-100 (recommend-
ing that Fort Monmouth receive the communications and electronics management from
Aviation-Troop Command, Missouri, the Military Transportation Management Command
(MTMC) from Bayonne Military Ocean Terminal, and the research and development
activities from Rome Laboratory).
114 2005 BRAC REPORT, supra note 10, at 11. The community did not raise any envi-
ronmental concerns during the BRAC process, but it did raise concerns over job loss,
economic impact, and the effect on local veterans groups. Id. The local community expects
to lose over 10,000 jobs because of the closure. Id. at 0-19. Fort Monmouth was the third
largest employer in Monmouth County and thought to be an anchor of an economically
growing region. Ann Scott Tyson, Military Is Consolidating Into Large Installations;
Reshuffling of Forces Would Create Big Multi-Service Bases, WASH. POST, May 14, 2005,
at A10. The community raised concerns after the BRAC decision because the Commission
recommended that the "movement of organizations, functions, or activities from Fort
Monmouth to Aberdeen Proving Ground will be accomplished without disruption of their
support to the Global War on Terrorism." 2005 BRAC REPORT, supra note 10, at 12; see
also Keith Brown, BRAC Stipulation 'Almost Enhances the Uncertainty,' ASBURY PARK
PRESS, Aug. 25, 2005, at A4 (indicating that locals thought the "without disruption"
stipulation meant that they would have no idea when the fort would actually close).
115 2005 BRAC REPORT, supra note 10, at P-2, P-4. The environmental restoration would
focus on the eleven operational firing ranges and removing polychlorinated biphenyl spill
and hazards within historic buildings. Id.
116 Id.
117 Todd B. Bates, Cleanup, Transfer of Property Take Time, ASBURY PARK PRESS, Aug. 25,
2005, at A4.
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3. Local and Federal Government Action
The local community aggressively pursued redevelopment in case
the fort ultimately closed."' Local mayors formed a committee (The Fort
Monmouth Reuse Committee), met with OEA, and sought a grant to begin
the redevelopment plan-all in advance of the official closure notice." 9
Planning in advance typically reduces the time required to redevelop the
land, which is already lengthy due to environmental costs and construc-
tion.120 However, Fort Monmouth's redevelopment time may actually in-
crease because not all interested parties were involved in the committee.
Shortly after the closure report, the county government formed its own
redevelopment commission (the Fort Monmouth 2010 Commission), and
less than a month after the closure decision, one of the mayors (Mayor
Tarantolo of Eatontown) moved forward with a redevelopment plan that
only benefitted his municipality, to the detriment of his neighbors.' 2' He
claimed Eatontown could redevelop the land adjacent to the base (Howard
Commons) because it was former base housing, sits adjacent to a zoned
residential area, and has limited, if any, environmental issues.122 The
11' Keith Brown, Now, to 'Plan B. 3 Mayors Sketch Out Redevelopment Ideas, ASBURY PARK
PRESS, Aug. 25, 2005, at Al. The National Association of Defense Communities recom-
mends starting a "Plan-B" (redevelop planners, instead of "Plan-A" petitioners to keep the
base open) before the final decisions are made and they should begin in earnest to see other
closed bases, gather information and organize redevelopment plans. YvONNE DAwSON,
NAID, AN ASS'N OF DEF. CMTYS., ORGANIZING YOUR PLANNING EFFORT: THE FIRST STEPS
IN INSTALLATION REDEVELOPMENT 6-8 (2005), available at httpJ/www .defensecommunities.
org/Downloads/Planning.LRA.pdf. While moving forward with Plan-B, the state and local
officials continued to pursue Plan-A, even after the Commission announced its findings.
See Corzine v. 2005 Def. Base Closure & Realignment Comm'n, 388 F. Supp. 2d 446,450
(D.N.J. 2005) (holding that the Federal Court lacked subject matterjurisdiction over a case
requesting judicial oversight of BRAC Commission decisions).
1.9 Brown, supra note 118, at Al.
120 Bates, supra note 117, at A4 (noting that the environmental cleanup process at Fort
Monmouth would be 'short" (3-4 years)); Brown, supra note 118, at Al (noting that rede-
velopment could take up to 31 months from the time of the final decision to shut the fort).
121Nina Rizzo, County Plans Its Own Panel, ASBURY PARK PRESS, Aug. 26, 2005, at A13;
Keith Brown, Eatontown Eyes Commons Borough Wants to Redevelop Site at Ft. Monmouth,
ASBURY PARKPRESS, Oct. 14,2005, at B1. Eatontown had commissioned a $50,000 study
of the area in 2003. Id.
122 See CITY & REG'L PLANNING STUDIO, UNIV. OF PA. GRADUATE SCH. OF DESIGN, FORT
MONMOUTH REUSE: RECONNAISSANCE REPORT AND CONCEPT PLAN 56 (2006) [hereinafter
CRPS, FORT MONMOUTH REUSE], available at http://www.boroughofeatontown.comlfinrc
2006FMReuseConceptPlan.pdf. Howard Commons is contained within the Charles Wood
Area, which has several buildings that can be reused, has had many buildings already
demolished, and has only one landfill site. See id.
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redevelopment of Fort Monmouth will require maintaining open spaces
and protecting ecosystems. 23
4. Roadblocks to Redevelopment
The municipal leaders clashed with state officials over who should
control the redevelopment process. 24 In January 2006, the state quickly
responded with a bill that created the Fort Monmouth Redevelopment
Authority ("Authority"). 12 The Fort Monmouth Economic Revitalization
Planning Authority Act ("FMERPA") asserted state legislative control over
the redevelopment process.12 The legislature acted to ensure that the
redevelopment process benefitted the entire State. 27 The Act established
a committee that was organized so that local, county, and state govern-
ments and citizens all had a voice in the process.12 Most Authority actions
123 [T~he ecology, hydrology, and coastal location of Fort Monmouth render
the site environmentally sensitive and highly vulnerable to extreme
weather and foreseen changes in climate. The buried traces of pollution,
contained and invisible, yet dangerous if disturbed, also jeopardize the
installation's existing environmental conditions.... [Fluture develop-
ment must respect the land's capacity to absorb increased storm, surface
and ground water burdens caused by additional impervious surfaces
and below-grade building foundations.
Id. at 50.
124 Keith Brown, Fort's Closing May Spark Governmental Tug of War, ASBURY PARK PRESS,
Nov. 15, 2005, at Al. At a conference entitled Fort Monmouth: Past, Present and in the
Future, state and local officials disagreed over control. The local leaders insisted that the
redevelopment project "is not too big of ajob," while state officials argued that the project
"is bigger than the municipalities" and that the state wants to avoid "serious mistakes."
Id. (quoting Brendan Tobin, Fort Monmouth Reuse Committee member (the local mayoral
committee), and State Senator Joseph M. Kyrillos Jr. respectively).
125 S. 1049, 212th Legis. (N.J. 2006) (enacted).
126 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:271 (West 2007).
127 Id. § 52:271-2.
128 The authority shall consist often members to be appointed and qualified
as follows:
(1) Four [public] members appointed by the Governor...;
(2) The... Secretary of... New Jersey Commerce... ;
(3) One member, who shall be a resident of Monmouth County, to be
appointed by the Monmouth County Board of Chosen Freeholders... ;
(4) The mayors of Eatontown, Oceanport, and Tinton Falls, ex officio
and voting; and
(5) A representative of Fort Monmouth, to be appointed by the Secretary
of the United States Department of Defense, who shall be a non-voting
member.
Id. § 52:271-6.
530 [Vol. 32:513
20081 BRINGING SEXY BRAC 531
require a six-vote majority, which operates to deprive the local mayor bloc
of any veto power over redevelopment decisions.'29 This counters the pre-
viously proposed redevelopment authority that would increase the
mayors' power over decisions. 3 ° Further ensuring the neutrality of the
Authority, no member may have a direct or indirect interest in the re-
development contracts.
131
C. Analysis of Case Studies
Fort McClellan's redevelopment is a success story for the BRAC
Commission." 2 The Fort McClellan JPA achieved its success in spite of
its rural location, previous reliance on the military for jobs and economic
growth,"' local jurisdictional infighting,"3 and lengthy environmental
cleanup.135 Fort Monmouth faces redevelopment of a base with similar prob-
lems. 36 Yet the bases responded differently when forming their local reuse
authorities." 7 However, the different types of redevelopment authorities
will not lead to a variation in success. Both redevelopment authorities
129 See id. § 52:271-7. At the first meeting of the FMERPA, Dr. Robert Lucky was elected
Chairperson. Dr. Lucky is a public member, which means he is a governor-appointee. The
only other member nominated was Mayor Tarantolo, who received three votes: himself,
and his fellow mayors. John G. Donnelly, Fort Monmouth Economic Revitalization Plan-
ning Authority, Meeting Minutes from July 14, 2006, at 2 (2006), available at http://nj
.gov/fmerpa/meetings/20060714.pdf.
13o Brian Lee, Forward March for Fort Reuse Panel, ASBURY PARK PRESS, Mar. 14,2006, at
IA ('The mayors had proposed a seven-member authority to include themselves, a member
of the [county] freeholder board, two gubernatorial appointments and an unnamed member
of the governor's Cabinet."). Dr. Lucky was New Jersey Governor Corzine's choice for
chairman. Keith Brown, Fort Monmouth Redevelopment Panel Picks Leader, ASBURY PARK
PRESS, July 15, 2006, at lB.
131 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:271-6(f).
132 See Renee Gamela, Could Its Success Happen Here?, OBSERVER-DISPATCH, Dec. 11, 2005,
at IA.
133 See 1995 BRAC REPORT, supra note 9, at 1-2.
131 See Smith, supra note 101, at 7C.
135 Id.
136 See 2005 BRAC REPORT, supra note 10, at 0-19, P-2 (detailing the economic loss due to
closing Fort Monmouth and the cost of environmental restoration); CRPS, FORT MONMOUTH
REUSE, supra note 122, at 2 (Fort Monmouth lies within three separate jurisdictions); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 52:271 (dividing power and control of the Fort Monmouth Redevelopment
Authority).
131 Compare Smith, supra note 101, at 7C (forming Fort McClellan's JPA, which does not
permit elected officials to serve, and allowing the JPA to have closed door meetings), with
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:271-6 (West 2007) (vesting minority power in local elected officials but
allowing the governor to select a majority of members with very open proceedings).
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signal a preference for strong local involvement in the process and recog-
nize the need to stimulate redevelopment with a quicker transition period.
As both planning commissions recognized, a redevelopment plan
that allows each local municipality to redevelop their respective adjacent
base property would be ineffective and economically unsound. 138 At bases
with several surrounding municipalities, a state-run planning authority
has been the most common and successful response. 139 Bases like Fort
Monmouth, with several surrounding jurisdictions, 4 ° have more factors
to consider than a single-jurisdiction base-water rights, environmental
concerns, different zoning laws, transportation systems, and multiple land
conveyances.' New Jersey Governor Corzine attempted to account for
these regional and state-wide concerns when making his appointments
to the FMERPA.'42
Successful redevelopment depends on varying factors." Leadership
and teamwork among officials at all levels of government avoids problems
with environmental cleanup.' Further, the key component of all base
138 CRPS, FORT MONMOUTH REUSE, supra note 122, at 59 (noting that a redevelopment plan
with power vested in local self-interested municipalities would a) not have the power
necessary to guide redevelopment for the benefit of the region, and b) result in long-term
damage to the political and environmental climates). In an attempt to remove the self-
interest from the redevelopment, FMERPA forbids its members from having an interest
in the redevelopment outside their membership in the Authority. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §
52:27I-6(f).
139 See BERNARDJ. FRIEDEN & CHRISTIE I. BAXTER, FROM BARRACKS TO BUSINESS: THE M.I.T.
REPORT ON BASE REDEVELOPMENT 25 (2000) [hereinafter FRIEDEN & BAXTER, M.I.T.
REPORT], available at http://www.eda.gov/ImageCache/EDAPublic/documents/pdfdocs/
1g3_5f14_5fbarracks_5fbusiness_2epdf/vl/lg3_5fl4_5fbarracks_5fbusiness.pdf. In cases
where a base closure affected several local communities, the state stepped in and created
a planning board, but when a base closure legitimately affects only one municipality, that
municipality can create a redevelopment authority and be successful. Id. (using the re-
development of NAS Alameda, which was contained within the city of Alameda, itself an
island, as an example).
140 CRPS, FORT MONMOUTH REUSE, supra note 122, at 2 (noting Fort Monmouth lies within
three boroughs).
141 FRIEDEN & BAXTER, M.I.T. REPORT, supra note 139, at 25.
142 See Keith Brown, Four Monmouth County Residents Approved for Fort Redevelopment
Panel, ASBURYPARKPRESS, July 1, 2006, at 3A. Appointed were an environmentalist, a real
estate agent, a technology guru, and a labor representative. Id.
143 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-01-1054T, MILITARY BASE CLOSURES: OVERVIEW
OF ECONOMIC RECOVERY, PROPERTY TRANSFER, AND ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP 5 (1999)
[hereinafter GAO, OVERVIEW OF ECONOMIC RECOVERY]. The GAO-identified factors that
affect the economic recovery of base realignments are strong national economy, diversified
local economy, regional economic trends, natural and labor resources, leadership and team-
work, public confidence, government assistance, and reuse of base property.
1 4 Id. at 6.
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reuse is the base redevelopment and its ability to generate economic activ-
ity in the local community. " Increasing economic activity while redevelop-
ing a site during prolonged environmental cleanup is extremely difficult
for any agency, whether local or federal.146 As cleanup continues, the cost
continues to rise.
147
Additionally, federal, state and local property and environmental
laws impact the base closure and realignment process. 14' The process in-
volves collaboration from many different parties to fulfill many different
obligations.'49 For example, the DOD must undertake several duties under
various environmental statutes as well as determine any jurisdictional
issues between the state and local governments. 15 Local duties require
creating a redevelopment authority, a redevelopment plan (which accounts
for the environmental status of the base), and communicating the process
to the public.'
The DOD recognizes the importance of transferring title of the
closed base to the local community, 152 but it rarely does so.' The
14 Id. As discussed above, this paper has established how the state government, not the
local municipalities, will control the redevelopment process at Fort Monmouth. See supra
notes 125-31 and accompanying text.
14 See GAO, OVERVIEW OF ECONOMIC RECOVERY, supra note 143, at 14. Transfer of property
to local communities before complete environmental cleanup is a powerful tool, but cleanup
must continue before the land can be used. DOD estimates that some sites will require
cleanup and monitoring well after 2015. Id.
147 See id. at 15 (estimating DOD's costs for environmental cleanup increased $1 billion
between 1999 and 2001).
148 DOD, BASE REDEVELOPMENT AND REALIGNMENT MANUAL, supra note 12, at 26, 129-34.
14' Key players in the base closure and redevelopment process include representatives from
the Military Department, the Base Transition Coordinator, the OEA, the LRA, local and
state governments, and other federal, state and local organizations. Id. at 26-27.
150 Id.
" Id. The LRA must prepare a base redevelopment plan, which accounts for the environ-
mental status of the base, before the military undertakes its environmental cleanup report.
Id. at 33, 103.
152 The Department of Defense has established four key environmental
objectives when closing or realigning installations: [1)] Ensure protection
of human health and the environment on BRAC properties. [2)] Expedi-
tiously transfer BRAC property to new owners. [3)] Maximize the utility
of BRAC property by making wise public policy and business decisions
regarding environmental actions. [4)] Maximize the use of all available
tools to expedite response actions and redevelopment, including inte-
gration of early transfer authorities and privatization of response actions
with redevelopment.
Id. at 97 (emphasis added). The DOD has met the first three provisions successfully but has
not been successful with the fourth. GAO, STATUS OF PRIOR ROUNDS, supra note 20, at 55.
153 GAO, STATUS OF PRIOR ROUNDS, supra note 20, at 78-79 ("The most consistent major
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government can attempt to engage in fast-track cleanup, but fast-track
cleanup requires coordinated interaction between the DOD, EPA, and
state environmental agencies that can interfere with property transfer."
However, the DOD can avoid this delay by leasing the property to users
before conveying it.155 Local and state authorities have the greatest incen-
tive to ensure successful environmental cleanup and redevelopment.156
Local, state and federal authorities must look to other contamination
and cleanup examples to find ways to expedite and effectively ensure
cleanup and successful redevelopment.
III. IMPLEMENTING LOCAL CONTROL OF ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP
AND REDEVELOPMENT THROUGH THE SPENDING CLAUSE: THE
BROWNFIELD EXAMPLE
A. Background on the Brownfield Redevelopment Problem
States must not only redevelop closing military bases, but also a
whole host of other dangerous, contaminated sites. One such type of site is
a "brownfield."5 7 Congress recently passed legislation158 that attempts to
concern cited by officials.., was that the transfer of property to the reuse authority was
slow.... DOD officials.., do not seem to understand that delaying property conveyance
is bad for business.").
154 See ENVTL. CLEANUP OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., FAST-TRACK CLEANUP: SUCCESSES AND
CHALLENGES 1993-1995 (1996), available at https://www.denix.osd.mil/denix/Public/
Library/Cleanup/ CleanupOfcfDocuments/BRAC/fast.html.
155 GAO, STATUS OF PRIOR ROUNDS, supra note 20, at 29.
156 See ENVTL. CLEANUP OFFICE, supra note 154.
157 Scholars, government, agencies and industry all disagree on the definition ofbrownfield.
See NAT'L ENVTL. POLICY INST., How CLEAN IS CLEAN?: WHITE PAPER ON BROWNFIELDS
38 (1995) (declaring "[there is no commonly accepted definition ofbrownfields"); OFFICE
OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, STATE OF THE STATES ON BROWNFIELDS: PROGRAMS FOR CLEANUP
AND REUSE OF CONTAMINATED SITES 3 (1995) [hereinafter OTA, STATE OF THE STATES]
(stating "[brown fi elds have nearly as many definitions as there are interested parties").
For the limited purposes of this Note, the definition ofa brownfield is an "abandoned, idled
or underused industrial and commercial facilit[y] where expansion or redevelopment is
complicated by real or perceived environmental contamination." OTA, STATE OF THE
STATES, supra at 3 (citing Timothy Fields, Jr., Deputy Assistant Administrator, Office of
Solid Waste and Emergency Response, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Federal
Agency Brownfields Initiatives, Presentation at the Environmental Law Institute ( Mar. 28,
1995)).
'" Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-
118, 115 Stat. 2356 (2002) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (Supp. 1 2003)).
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facilitate brownfield redevelopment by "address [ing] the environmental, eco-
nomic and environmental justice concerns associated with brownfields." 59
Problems with brownfield redevelopment include multi-jurisdictional
liability, 6 ' a broad regulatory scheme that scares away redevelopment,' 6 '
and local communities suffering economically from slow or non-existent
redevelopment.162 Surprisingly, the problems with brownfield redevelop-
ment exist despite the many success stories.'63
Brownfields and BRAC-closed bases face similar issues. Both
BRAC-closed bases and brownfield sites "share the same goal of cleaning
up sites so that they are safe for ... the environment."'64 Additionally,
brownfields and BRAC-closed bases share the problems of(1) site cleanup,
(2) revitalization, and (3) multijurisdictional oversight.' 65 BRAC-closed
bases and brownfields have striking similarities in the context of environ-
mental liability and regulation.'66 This Note illustrates the similarities
between the two cleanup scenarios and highlights the brownfield successes,
ultimately concluding that what has worked for brownfields may work for
BRAC-closed bases.
B. Brownfield Redevelopment Positives and Negatives
Brownfield sites have many qualities that are attractive to devel-
opers.6 7 Brownfield redevelopment can use the existing water and sewer
159 Flannary P. Collins, Note, The Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields
Revitalization Act: A Critique, 13 DuKE ENVTL. L. & POLY F. 303, 305 (2003).
0 See Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Time Oil Co., 738 F. Supp. 1339, 1343 (W.D. Wash. 1990).
... Thomas A. Newlon, Will Changes Speed Brownfield Cleanups?, SEATTLE DAILY J. OF
COM., Aug. 21, 1997, at 1.
... See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Brownfields Cleanup and Redevelopment:
Brownfields Tax Incentive, http://www.epa.gov/swerosps/bf/bftaxinc.htm (last visited
Jan. 10, 2008). The goal of the incentive is to create tax incentives that will stimulate
investment and ultimately earn high tax revenues after redevelopment. Id.
163 See generally U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Brownfields Success Stories,
http'/www.epa.gov/brownfields/success.htm (last visited Jan 10, 2008) ('These accomplish-
ments include transforming brownfields into thriving new centers of commerce and industry;
creating jobs through cleanup and reuse; formatting innovative partnerships among federal,
state, and local governments and private-sector stakeholders... [B]rownfields restoration has
positively impacted local economies and the quality of life for neighboring communities.").
164 ITRC LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 59, at iii.
1 5 Id. at iv.
166 See id. at 64-68 (charting the similarities between the two types of sites).
16 7 See William Tucker, Industry Goes Where the Grass is Greener: Superfund Sparks Flight
to Suburban Locations, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1993, at A9 (noting one case in which an
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systems.16 Additionally, brownfield sites often have many potential
benefits that would contribute to economic development. 169 Redevelopers
can use the existing infrastructure. 170 However, redevelopers face liability
under environmental laws such as CERCLA and its state counterparts.'
7
'
Many scholars believe that environmental liability is the most serious
barrier to redevelopment.
172
C. Dealing with the Environmental Liability Problem
Redevelopers' liability under state environmental laws share
some common principles, but often vary greatly. 173 Most states prohibit
voluntary cleanups on the most seriously contaminated sites.174 In an
effort to hasten cleanup and redevelopment, states are developing two
types of standards: (1) generic and (2) site-specific. 175 The second standard,
site-specific, incorporates the future use of the site into the cleanup plan.'
urban and suburban site were competing for development and the urban site was "perfect"
except that the environmental costs were too high to justify the investment).
"' See Julia A. Solo, Comment, Urban Decay and the Role of Superfund: Legal Barriers to
Redevelopment and Prospects for Change, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 285, 301 (1995).
169 Eisen, supra note 28, at 897-98.
171 Urban Land Reclamation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Technology, Environment,
and Aviation of the H. Comm. on Science, Space, and Technology, 103d Cong. 25 (June 9,
1994) (testimony of Charles Bartsch, Senior Policy Analyst, Northeast-Midwest Institute).
171 Eisen, supra note 28, at 898-959 & n.67.
172 See Solo, supra note 168, at 285; GREGG EASTERBROOK, A MOMENT ON THE EARTH: THE
COMING AGE OF ENVIRONMENTAL OPTIMIsM 617 (1995) (stating that "[Mn cities such as
Newark, New Jersey, [environmental liability has] had the effect of insuring that old
industrial properties could not be converted into new uses").
' Eisen, supra note 28, at 920 & n.179.
174 Id. at 923-25 & nn.192-93.
175 The two types are described as:
(1) standardized state-approved generic statewide cleanup standards,
based on assumptions about exposure to contamination; and (2) site-
specific standards, requiring a risk assessment to be performed at every
site, but often incorporating consideration of the future use of the site
(i.e., industrial, commercial, or residential) and allowing some cleanups
that result in a public health risk higher than that currently allowed
under CERCLA.
Id. at 937 (footnotes omitted).
176 OTA, STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 157, at 15-16; Mark D. Anderson, The State
Voluntary Cleanup Program Alternative, 10 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 22,23-24 (describ-
ing three state approaches); Clement Dinsmore, Recycling Brownfields: The Legislative
Climate, 2 J. URB. TECH. 9, 11. See Eisen, supra note 28, at 938-40, for a table of state
cleanup standards.
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A site-specific standard benefits sites originally deemed too expensive to
cleanup and unique sites that have features absent from the average con-
taminated site.177 Just as state planning for redevelopment varies, so too
does the level of state oversight.17 Industry and developers affect state over-
sight because they exert financial pressure on state regulators. 179 State
regulators without much public representation face the most stinging criti-
cism. "° Expanding public representation of the affected communities is
critical to redevelopment efforts. 18 1 States must pass legislation governing
cleanups to combat problems in state brownfield redevelopment efforts. 8 2
The main problems are little public input, the danger of industry
capturing state regulators and the lack of incentives that industry has to
clean up sites.8 3 To solve these problems, scholars have suggested improv-
ing community input, amending state statutory schemes, and establishing
legitimate state decision-making bodies.' While the solution is a local
one, it requires federal interaction to effect it.
D. Federal Government Involvement and Interaction with the
States
In the 1990s the federal government started to promote state
cleanups of brownfield sites. 8 5 The federal government should involve
"' See Cliff Tuttle, The New Hot Properties: Old Industrial Sites: New 'Brownfield'Laws
Should Entice Developers, Lenders, PA. L. WKLY., Oct. 30, 1995, at 13 (concluding that
Pennsylvania's site-specific standard "offers the greatest opportunity to renew properties
previously considered too expensive for voluntary remediation").
7
' Eisen, supra note 28, at 965-70 (chronicling the three categories or levels of state over-
sight, which include: (1) active state oversight, (2) state-delegated oversight to certified
professionals, and (3) state involvement only in the final review of the property to ensure
that cleanup is complete).
179 William W. Buzbee, Remembering Repose: Voluntary Contamination Cleanup Approvals,
Incentives, and the Costs of Interminable Liability, 80 MINN. L. REV. 35, 113 (1995).
180 See Michael Wheeler, Negotiating NIMBYs: Learning from the Failure of the
Massachusetts Siting Law, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 241, 277 (1994).
181 See Anne L. Kelly, Reinvention in the Name of Environmental Justice: A View from
State Government, 14 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 769,782 (1995) (stating that "[p] articipation at this
[state] level is central to the environmental justice movement and cannot be compromised
in such redevelopment efforts.").
182 Eisen, supra note 28, at 1031.
183 id.
's4 Id. at 1031-32.
1s5 Id. at 986-91 (stating that the federal government acted to promote state cleanups by:
(1) removing"[1] iability for [s]ites [r]emediated in [a]pproved [s]tate [p]rograms," and; (2)
clarifying "the [i]nnocent [1landowner [diefense").
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itself in the process to improve the efficiency of cleanups"186 and ensure
state programs produce clean lands." 7 One solution that would promote
state oversight would be for the federal government to permit the states
to release developers from future liability, provided the EPA approves the
state regulatory program.188 Federal promotion of state-regulated cleanup
efforts allows the local governments to monitor cleanup, and it is the local
governments who are best suited to do so. 89 Plus, long-term success is
ultimately tied to local government oversight. 190
Local government oversight produces successful environmental
cleanup for several reasons.' 9 Local governments are: (1) in a better
position to respond to local conditions; (2) in a better position to make
sense of the data; (3) in the best position to initiate, implement, and en-
sure land use controls that the site-specific environmental problems will
require; and (4) permitted to take an adaptable (not centralized) approach
to problem solving.
192
Local control ofbrownfield redevelopment is successful when author-
ities and developers know the extent of environmental contamination.1
93
As part of the BRAC procedures, the DOD must prepare detailed envi-
ronmental impact statements (called EBSs and ECPs).194 The LRAs and
DOD already use the EBSs and ECPs to assist in forming the reuse plan
because the report contains information on utility lines, detailed maps,
and information on environmental contamination. 19 Thus the BRAC pro-
cedure already produces documents that would assist a local controlled
solution to redevelopment.
The final concern is determining how to encourage the states to
implement the type of regulation and controls that will both satisfy national
environmental concerns and promote local, efficient cleanup. The DOD, in
partnership with the OEA, already provides BRAC-affected communities
186 See Buzbee, supra note 179, at 110-11.
187 See id. at 115.
188 Eisen, supra note 28, at 986-87.
19Matthew D. Fortney, Comment, Devolving Control over Mildly Contaminated Property:
The Local Cleanup Program, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 1863, 1888 (2006).190 Id. at 1889.
191 Id. at 1886-88.
192 See generally id. at 1886-91 (outlining arguments in favor of local control of brownfield
redevelopment).
193 See id. at 1905.
194 See ITRC LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 59, at 6-7.
195 Id.
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with advisors and grants to jump-start the redevelopment process. 96 The
DOD does this because it previously recognized that communities have
unique aspects and no single template will fit all closure situations. 9 A
solution that uses local governments to implement redevelopment is best;
however, the federal government must ensure it adheres to some level
of national standards. A potential solution is to use grants from the fed-
eral government to the states for meeting federal standards, which fits
nicely into a potential Spending Power delegation paradigm.
IV. CONGRESS'S SPENDING POWER TO DELEGATE AND ITS POTENTIAL
FOR USE WITH BRAC CLEANUP
A. Congress's Spending Power Is Broad and Provides an Avenue
to Delegate, Which the Commerce Power Does Not
Congress may rely on the states to implement the goals of federal
policy so long as it is done within specific bounds. 9 Congress may use fed-
eral funds to induce state regulation, require federal agencies to preempt
state law if the states do not regulate as desired, delegate powers to the
states, and direct states to implement federal programs (without state
cooperation).'99 For purposes of federal spending, the important power is
the federal government's power to direct the disbursement of funds based
on state regulatory actions that Congress could impose.2"' Congress has
the power to regulate the BRAC process and has done so in the past,
20 1
196 See DOD, BASE REDEVELOPMENT AND REALIGNMENT MANUAL, supra note 12, at 33.
19 7 Id. at 32.198 See Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May Congress Commandeer
State Officers to Implement Federal Law?, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1009-11 (1995).
'
99 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167, 169-77 (1992) (discussing the forms
of intergovernmental relations but applying the term "cooperative federalism" only to
backup federal regulation (citing Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc.,
452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981))); Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical
Roots and Contemporary Models, 54 MD. L. REV. 1141, 1148-78 (1995) (tracing the
various cooperative federalism approaches that Congress historically adopted).
0 0 See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203,207-08 (1987) (holding that federal spending
conditions are constitutional if they: (1) are enacted for the general welfare; (2) are
unambiguous; (3) are reasonably related to the purpose of the expenditure; and (4) do not
violate other constitutional provisions). See generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 ("The
Congress shall have Power To ... provide for the . . . general Welfare of the United
States .... ").
20 See 10 U.S.C. § 2687 (2000).
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and Congress would have the power to delegate some BRAC responsibility
to the states. °2
Congress might have the power to regulate state involvement in
the BRAC process under the Commerce Clause, °3 but current Commerce
Clause doctrine limits Congress's ability to regulate intrastate activities.° 4
B. Potential Disadvantages to Spending Clause Delegations That
Implicate Environmental Regulations
Despite the breadth and ease of a Spending Clause delegation, a
Spending Power approach that would delegate power to the states does
have its disadvantages. °5 For instance, delegation imposes accountability
concerns, insulates the federal government from scrutiny, may result in
state officials not following strict federal regulations, and blurs the line of
responsibility for particular policy that clouds the public's view of govern-
ment.2 °6 The final disadvantage is that states and state agencies acting
pursuant to federal directives may not produce laws that federal courts
207
can review.
C. Advantages to a Spending Clause Delegation of Power and
State Control of Environmental Cleanup Regulations
The federal government does have practical reasons for delegating
some authority to the states. Congress may wish to rely on the existing
resources and local expertise of state bureaucracies that already exist.
20°
... See Dole, 483 U.S. at 207-08. See generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
203 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
204 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
205 Joshua D. Sarnoff, Cooperative Federalism, The Delegation of Federal Power, and the
Constitution, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 205, 209-10 (1997).206 Id.
211 See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 856 (1986) (uphold-
ing Article I court power to adjudicate private rights as counterclaims to public rights
adjudication, because the Commission could not enforce its own orders but was required
to file an action in an Article III court); Thomas v. Union Carbide Prods. Co., 473 U.S.
568, 583 (1985) (upholding legislation authorizing administrative arbitration of factual
disputes without providing for Article III judicial review); N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v.
Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 63-76 (1982) (plurality opinion of Justice Brennan).
20
' See Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating
State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L. J. 1196, 1201(1977);
John P. Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L. REV. 1183,
1192-93 (1995); Kirsten Engel, Reconsidering the National Market in Solid Waste:
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State authorities may be able to coordinate specific policies with other
activities such as zoning and planning. °9 State agencies may be better
situated than federal bureaucrats to assess local conditions and citizen
preferences.21 ° Also, a delegation allows for the government that is more
accountable to make the important decisions. 1 Some scholars question
whether these factors actually benefit local communities.212 Despite the
scholarly attack, Congress continues to delegate and states continue to
succeed in cleaning up.213
D. Supreme Court Precedent Protects State Regulations, Which
Are Stricter than Federal Standards
While scholars may attack delegation to the states,21 4 the Supreme
Court has upheld federal laws that vest regulatory supremacy to the
Trade-Offs in Equity, Efficiency, Environmental Protection, and State Autonomy, 73 N.C.
L. REV. 1481, 1523-24 & nn.174-77 (1995).
'Both Hamilton and Madison envisioned federal use of state executives
to administer the new federal laws that were to be applied to individuals.'
They recognized that the new federal system might engender diseconomies
to the extent that federal law enforcement efforts would substantially
duplicate or overlap with existing state operations.
Caminker, supra note 198, at 1043 (quoting Saikrishna B. Prakash, Field Office Federalism,
79 VA. L. REV. 1957 (1997).
209 See Dwyer, supra note 208, at 1198-1208; cf Caminker, supra note 198, at 1006,
1014-15 (stating for similar reasons that federal directives to states may be more effective
and efficient than federal regulation).
21o See Dwyer, supra note 208, at 1185 & n.10; Percival, supra note 199, at 1175; cf George
A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Community and
the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 331, 341-42 (1994).
211 Esty, supra note 55, at 609-10 (longings for direct democracy and distrust of elite
decisionmaking by republican representatives fuel claims for more decentralized decision-
making); cf Ken Kollman et al., Political Institutions and Sorting in a Tiebout Model, 87
AM. ECON. REV. 977, 983-85 (1997) (stating that economic models of the benefits of local
governmental autonomy depend both on citizen and governmental choices; when a single
jurisdiction exists, democratic referenda perform best; as the number ofjurisdictions in-
crease, democratic referenda "now yield[] the lowest aggregate utility and proportional
representation now performs second best").
212 Sarnoff, supra note 205, at 214-15.
211 See Esty, supra note 55, at 605 (noting the trend in legal scholarship and political action
toward decentralization of environmental regulation).
214 See Stewart, supra note 208, at 1212. See generally William W. Bratton & Joseph A.
McCahery, Regulatory Competition, Regulatory Capture, and Corporate Self-Regulation,
73 N.C. L. REV. 1861 (1996).
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215
states and federal agencies. The Court, in Union Electric Co. v. EPA,
preserved the rights of states to exercise stricter regulations. 216 The Court
construed the statute at issue so as to avoid an unconstitutional legisla-
tive delegation.217 The Court does its best to avoid making the tough dele-
gation calls in many of these cases and leaves many delegation questions
unanswered.218
Environmental regulation, one of the most far-reaching assertions
of federal authority, produces additional ambiguities and questions for the
Court.21 9 While constitutional questions that federal environmental regu-
lation raise often center around federalism,220 a regulation passed under
the Spending Clause avoids federalism concerns and challenges.22" ' A
change in the Court's jurisprudence would result in a substantial effect
on all federal environmental legislation.222 However, a change is unlikely
because the Court's recent Spending Clause decisions have struck down
federal statutes only when the action rose to the level of "coercion" under
the Dole test.223 When determining whether a statute coerces a state,
21 See Union Elec. Co. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 427 U.S. 246 (1976).
216 Id. at 264-65.
217 See id. at 256.
211 See generally Sarnoff, supra note 205, at 264-70 (chronicling the Court's avoidance of
tough delegation calls through various measures).
219 Jonathan H. Adler, Judicial Federalism and the Future of Federal Environmental
Regulation, 90 IOWA L. REV. 377, 379-80 (2005). See generally MICHAEL S. GREVE, THE
DEMISE OF ENVIRONMENTALISM IN AMERICAN LAw (1996).
220 See Philip P. Frickey & Steven S. Smith, Judicial Review, the Congressional Process,
and the Federalism Cases:An Interdisciplinary Critique, 111 YALE L.J. 1707, 1722 (2002).
221 Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, Getting Off the Dole: Why the Court Should
Abandon Its Spending Doctrine, and How a Too-Clever Congress Could Provoke It to Do So,
78 IND. L.J. 459, 502-04 (2003); see also Jesse H. Choper & John C. Yoo, The Scope of the
Commerce Clause after Morrison, 25 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 843, 857 (2000) ("Given the
broad sweep of the spending power as currently construed, the federal government would
quite clearly have the ability to evade the direct limits on its Commerce Clause powers.");
David Freeman Engstrom, Drawing Lines Between Chevron and Pennhurst: A Functional
Analysis of the Spending Power, Federalism, and the Administrative State, 82 TEX. L. REV.
1197, 1199 (2004) ("[F]oreclosure of federal regulation of states through Congress's other
enumerated powers has made the spending power a much more attractive source of federal
authority."); Rebecca E. Zietlow, Federalism's Paradox: The Spending Power and Waiver
of Sovereign Immunity, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 141, 190-91 (2002) (suggesting that the
Court "virtually has invited Congress to use its Spending Power to circumvent Tenth
Amendment limitations.").
222 Adler, supra note 219, at 435-36.
223 Id. at 440-47.
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courts can look to the amount of money Congress distributes.224 Environ-
mental legislation that conformed with Dole would likely not be coercive
and thus upheld. If Congress can require states to update environmental
regulations, the BRAC closure process lends itself to that solution because
of the current procedural requirements.
E. Spending Clause Success Stories in Environmental Regulation
and Why a Spending Clause BRAC Solution Would Succeed
Too
1. Concerns Generic to Locally Controlled Environmental
Cleanup Do Not Apply in the BRAC Context
Environmental regulation on the state and local level is growing in
number and success rate.225 Whether in waste site cleanup or brownfield
redevelopment, states have been proactive while the federal government
has not.226 The concerns that come with a Spending Power delegation and
state-run regulations do not apply in the BRAC context. The main con-
cern is that allowing state environmental regulation has the potential for
a "race to the bottom" of environmental safeguards. 2 7 The framework that
supports the "race to the bottom" argument has several weaknesses.228
The "race to the bottom" argument centers around the belief that corpo-
rations are attracted to states with less costly environmental regulations.229
224 See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 210 (1987).
225 See Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice
Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553, 636 (2001) (noting that "states, not the federal govern-
ment, produced the most innovation in pollution control legislation in the 1990s.").
226 Id. at 636. For additional examples of state-level experimentation, see generally
Alexander Volokh et al., Race to the Top: The Innovative Face of State Environmental
Management (Reason Pub. Policy Inst., Policy Study No. 239,1998), available at
http://www.reason.org/ps239.html.
227 Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a "Race" and Is It
"To the Bottom"?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271,274 (1997); Esty, supra note 55, at 597-99 (1996);
Stewart, supra note 208, at 1212; see Peter P. Swire, The Race to Laxity and the Race to
Undesirability: Explaining Failures in Competition Among Jurisdictions in Environmental
Law, 14 YALE L. & POLY REV. 67, 69 (1996).
22 See Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race-to-
the-Bottom" Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210,
1233-44 (1992); see also Adler, supra note 219, at 467-69.
229 See generally Wayne B. Gray, Manufacturing Plant Location: Does State Pollution
Regulation Matter? (Nat'l Bureau ofEcon. Research, Working Paper No. 5880,1997) (deter-
mining that states with stricter environmental regulation have fewer new manufacturing
plants).
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The argument fails in the base redevelopment context because no one
wants to redevelop on a contaminated site.23 ° If no one will redevelop with-
out appropriate environmental cleanup, states have corporate investment
as an incentive to require base cleanup to be as strict as possible.
2. States Have Incentives to Regulate BRAC Cleanup
Aggressively
States have other incentives to regulate BRAC cleanup aggres-
sively. States have the incentive to plan the cleanup and redevelopment
because state-run plans have had the most successful response.23' State
and local governments are more accountable to their constituents and
more motivated to see the redevelopment project succeed.232 States will
not be able to avoid general federal environmental regulations despite a
federal delegation of power.233
3. Current BRAC Procedures Would Easily Accommodate a
Spending Clause Delegation of Power to Affect State
Regulatory Change
The current BRAC procedures have many details in place that are
important to a successful local solution to environmental cleanup. State
and local governments already receive federal funds as part of the closure
and redevelopment process.2 34 The BRAC process already requires detailed
230 See Todd S. Davis & Kevin D. Margolis, Defining the Brownfields Problem, in
BROWNFIELDS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO REDEVELOPING CONTAMINATED PROPERTY 5
(Todd S. Davis & Kevin D. Margolis eds., 1997); Benjamin Krass, Combating Urban Sprawl
in Massachusetts: Reforming the ZoningAct Through Legal Challenges, 30 B.C. ENVTL. AFF.
L. REV. 605, 617 (2003).
231 In cases where several local communities are affected, the state steps in and creates
a planning board, but when a base closure legitimately affects only one municipality, that
municipality can create a redevelopment authority and be successful. FRIEDEN & BAXTER,
M.I.T. REPORT, supra note 139, at 25 (using the redevelopment of NAS Alameda, which was
contained within the city of Alameda, itself an island as an example).
2 2 See Fortney, supra note 189, at 1886-91 (outlining arguments in favor of local control
of brownfield redevelopment).
23 See Adler, supra note 219, at 472-73 (describing state subordination to federal environ-
mental regulation despite a congressional delegation).
234 DOD, BASE REDEVELOPMENT AND REALIGNMENT AND MANUAL, supra note 12, at 33; see
also GAO, STATUS OF PRIOR RouNDs, supra note 20, at 83 (noting that Fort McClellan's local
authority had received over $1.7 million in grants to plan its redevelopment process).
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environmental reports that aid in local brownfield redevelopment.235 To
encourage quicker, more efficient redevelopment without a depreciation
in quality, the federal government should use the Spending Clause to
encourage states to enact specific regulations that would control contami-
nated base cleanup for closed military bases.
CONCLUSION
The ultimate redevelopment success of currently contaminated
BRAC sites requires fast, efficient, and effective coordination among federal,
state and local officials. The bureaucracy of the BRAC process increases
regulatory confusion, cleanup delays and redevelopment problems. Sites
that have successfully redeveloped have one major similarity: a strong
local redevelopment authority that implemented a locally controlled
cleanup plan.
To better reproduce these results in the future, the federal gov-
ernment should consider adapting the BRAC procedures to endorse a
locally controlled environmental solution conditioned on meeting strict,
but malleable, requirements. The current BRAC process produces tools
helpful to a locally controlled redevelopment authority and also provides
funding to the redevelopment process. Congress's conditioning of those
funds on the enactment of environmental cleanup legislation specific to
the BRAC sites would be a proper Spending Power delegation. BRAC-
related regulations similar to what occurs in brownfield redevelopment
would remove the regulatory gridlock and potential liability that currently
surrounds environmental restoration on BRAC sites. By returning power
to the local level, the federal government will place communities in the
best position to cleanup, move on, and successfully redevelop.
235 See DOD, BASE REDEVELOPMENT AND REALIGNMENT MANUAL, supra note 12, at 33;
FORT MCCLELLAN IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 91, at 5-92 (including an analysis of
the potential environmental cleanup as well as the zoning restrictions facing the
redevelopment effort, both of which the JPA used in making their redevelopment
decisions).
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